# Diversity Visas Neg

## Neolib/K Links

### Link – Diversity Visas

#### Diversity visas create a false promise of a benevolent, inclusive immigration system

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The opening lines of the 2009 story, “The Thing Around Your Neck” by Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, describe the thinking of a visa lottery winner and her family. “You thought everybody in America had a car and a gun, your uncles and aunts thought so too,” the story begins. “After you won the American visa lottery, your uncles and aunts and cousins told you, in a month you will have a big car. Soon, a big house. But don't buy a gun like those Americans.”4 As the narrator Akunna prepares to travel on her own as a visa lottery winner, her ideas of the United States are abstract. She imagines easily accessible symbols of American wealth and power, readily within her grasp. As she departs from her home city of Lagos, Akunna’s family becomes the keeper of that

image, while she herself struggles as an immigrant in the United States. Her experience does not match her expectations. “You wanted to write that rich Americans were thin and poor Americans were fat and that many did not have a house and a car; you were still not sure about the guns, though, because they might have them inside their pockets.”5 But she does not write home, does not dispel her families’ ideas about life in the United States, does not alter the image Nigerians back home have of American streets paved with gold.

During the twenty years of its operation, the American visa lottery shaped what people in Africa imagined when they thought about the United States. By making concrete the possibility of emigrating to the United States, the DV lottery reinforced people’s ideas of the American Dream in Africa. The content of the dream borrowed from media and imagery beamed in from the West, linking life in the United States with consumer goods reflecting wealth and status - like cars and houses. Moreover, people imagined life in the United States in terms of what was missing in Africa: access to legal, political, and economic institutions that served the people instead of a tiny subsection of elites. Cyber café workers dreamed of the dazzling technology widely available in the United States. Students forced to end their studies prematurely thought going to the United States was the key to accessing education. People who had never traveled anywhere wanted a U.S. passport, in order to travel the world without obstruction. Visa lottery entrepreneurs promoted these images in their advertisements and signs. Importantly, emigrants themselves, like the protagonist of Adichie’s story, chose not to supplement these ideas with contrasting stories of African immigrant life in the United States, and when they did, people chose not to believe them.

Beyond amplifying ideas of American life that were otherwise available through media, cultural products, and internet access, the visa lottery produced another set of narratives about the United States and the American Dream in Africa. By appearing at a time when emigration was both highly important to people and a diminishing possibility, the lottery tapped into the epic of emigration, served it, and made the United States appear benevolent and open. The concept and format of the diversity lottery - a program that worshipped cultural difference and offered visas broadly, not just to the candidates with the highest qualifications - made the United States appear uniquely dedicated to diversity, equality, and democracy. As one visa entrepreneur in Cameroon put it, “Lucky game, like I said, it’s not in all about you being so superior, being so powerful, there’s nothing about it that can explain.”

Unlike former colonial masters that had turned their backs on Africa, and European countries that demonized immigrants, America was a less racist nation - a “no man’s land” to borrow a phrase from many Cameroonian visa entrepreneurs - where African immigrants could thrive. Africans who knew about U.S. immigration mostly though the legal channel of the diversity visa, imagined that immigrants in America had ample opportunities to live, work, and become Americans. Finally, the program appeared custom-designed for Africa. Not only did the lottery make visas available, but the opportunity for migration produced benefits for African countries, through remittances, expatriate investment, and further migration opportunities. The visa lottery appeared to be a particularly effective development program, aimed at lifting African countries out of poverty.

### Link – Neolib

#### US immigration policy is undergirded by the neoliberal nation-state – the construction of a multicultural “nation of immigrants” society is a hypocritical excuse for exploitative social hierarchies all for the sake of the market – the image of the immigrant assimilated into the ideal citizen justifies violence in the name of becoming a productive, good American.

Perry 14 (Leah Perry is a Cultural Studies & Gender & Sexuality Studies professor at SUNY Empire State College and author of *The Cultural Politics of US Immigration*, “Overlooking/Looking Over Neoliberal Immigration: Am nesty Policy in the ‘Nation of Immigrants’”, Cultural Studies, published 11 Mar 2014. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09502386.2014.886488>) lz

Amidst increasing immigration from Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean in the 1980s, when the circle of who was considered American seemed to have broadened considerably, reflecting democratic gains made by racial minorities and women, and when that broadening was increasingly visible in the daily lives of Americans via various media, the language and common imagery of immigration debates were, as the amnesty watershed suggests, reshaped and redefined, making immigration a key aspect of the rising neoliberal project. The three core dimensions of neoliberalism are modes of government-rooted in entrepreneurial values; policies that result in deregulation of the economy, liberalization of trade, and privatization of state services; and widespread acceptance of the theory that consumerist free trade will bring unprecedented prosperity to both the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ world (Steger and Roy 2010, pp. 11–14, 55). The neoliberal nation-state roots and limits government in free market entrepreneurial values and transactional logic that extends to the social sphere with the notion that ‘the social good will be maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions’ throughout the globe (Harvey 2005, p. 3); globalization is imbued with the ‘common sense’ logic that integrating markets universally increase individual freedom and progress (Ong 2006). Neoliberalism is crucial to immigration history because the ideology reshaped the causes and effects of immigration; that is, how and why people migrated, and how they were received. Likewise, O V E R L O O K I N G / L O O K I N G O V E R N E O L I B E R A L I M M I G R AT I O N 845 in keeping with American historical patterns of using immigration as a source of inexpensive labour (especially after the abolition of slavery and end of colonialism), immigrant labour is a vital component of neoliberal projects. The gender and racial hierarchies that cohered and were contested through 1980s immigration discourses inaugurated the paradigm of neoliberal immigration. Although salutary discourses about IRCA amnesty framed it as an actualization of the universal beneficence of the ‘nation of immigrants’ and its free market system, the implementation and consequences of the law strongly suggest that exploitation rather than democracy underscores the neoliberal project. More specifically, as president Ronald Reagan set out to revolutionize America with deregulation of the economy, privatization, and the globalization of capitalist democracy, lawmakers attempted to remedy an illegal immigration crisis with the first comprehensive immigration reform since 1965. IRCA, sponsored by a conservative, flagrantly nativist Wyoming senator Alan Simpson, ushered in new sanctions for employers of undocumented workers, welfare cuts, and increased border security, yet also included the amnesty programme. After five years of heated bi-partisan debates amongst pundits and numerous joint congressional hearings—highly unusual in immigration debates— the US Congress passed IRCA. Thus ‘multicultural’ immigrant men and women seemed to be embraced, but were in the same breath disciplined. In this period, as Asia, Latin America, and especially Mexico came to dominate U.S. immigrant sending countries, a new national narrative was popularized that affectively (and effectively) framed America as the globally exceptional guarantor of democratic rights, inclusivity, and equal access to economic mobility for all of its citizens. The quintessential American story became that of the white ethnic (Irish and eastern and southern European) immigrants who created a better life with nothing but hard work and plucky determination. According to the new ‘nation of immigrants’ narrative, any and all immigrants earned access to American equal opportunity through hard work and adherence to respectable heterosexual ‘family values’. This trope was key to the neoliberal negotiation between welcoming and gatekeeping. Within neoliberalism’s allegedly universally beneficial free market system, ‘ascriptions of value and valuelessness are unevenly detached from overt reference to race, yet their deployment provides for extreme racialized violence’ (Hong and Ferguson 2011, p. 17). While policy and capital appear to be neutral, neoliberalism accomplishes the extraction of surplus value from racialized and gendered bodies through universalized discourses of value that are detached from race and gender (equal opportunity for abstracted subjects) and through the mobilization of multicultural and often feminist rhetoric ‘as the key to a post-racist world of freedom and opportunity’ (Melamed 2011, p. 78). On one hand, discourse that welcomed and celebrated an abstracted immigrant subject who was free to succeed (compete) on the basis of individual hard work was 846 CULTURAL STUDIES coded as the epitome of Americanism. In this strain, race and gender were ‘overlooked’ or erased much like amnesty overlooked the offense of illegality, and this overlooking was considered anti-racist and anti-sexist. On the other hand, ‘nation of immigrants’ discourse that welcomed and celebrated explicitly racialized and gendered immigrants who were free to succeed on the basis of their hard work was also posited as emblematically American. Tokens of diversity or multiculturalism (i.e. immigrants of colour and especially immigrant women of colour) were appointed to stand as evidence of American inclusivity. Race and gender were thus looked over and overly looked at as indicators of America’s unparalleled commitment to equality, a commitment that was best realized through all citizens’ access to the free market. Additionally, in both cases, ‘nation of immigrants’ discourse that framed amnesty as the path to citizenship (and thus freedom and rights) concealed and consequently reproduced racialized and gendered vulnerability in the service of neoliberalizing America. Monisha Das Gupta (2008) has observed, ‘full citizenship, which is the goal of civil rights-oriented visions of justice, naturalizes and reinscribes the policing functions of borders that territorialize racialized, ethnicized, and gendered notions of belonging. The civil rights model formulates the lack of or the routine violation of rights of subjects inhabiting a national space as second-class citizenship, a condition that needs to be corrected through struggles for full national belonging’ (p. 403). Immigrants whose realities were necessarily transnational and border-crossing given that neoliberal structural adjustment policies in the global south create poverty that often necessitates labor migration were erased: ‘immigrant rights when framed as civil rights get interpellated by discourses of citizenship’ (p. 404). Whether overlooking or overly looking at race and gender, ‘nation of immigrants’ tropes obscured the transnational realties of immigrants’ lives. To tease out the ways that amnesty naturalized a causal relationship between citizenship, freedom, and free markets and thereby obscured the inequalities underscoring the American neoliberal project, this article traces the ‘nation of immigrants’ tropes circulating in and around amnesty in the lawmaking process and in public discourses about that process. As I will explain, the material consequences of the law—namely the bureaucratic red tape that kept disproportionally Mexican male amnesty applicants legally liminal and highly dependant upon their employers during a five-year waiting period, women’s exclusion from amnesty, and the bald neocolonial extraction of temporary labour from Mexican men—were masked by the rhetoric of inclusion in the ‘nation of immigrants’. The trope was powerful in the context of an ostensibly widening circle of Americanness, but the material consequences of amnesty indicated that this new immigration legislation was not a facilitator of democracy. Much like Marx’s (1867/1990) notion of the commodity as a hieroglyph that concealed the alienation—from one’s own labour, everyone O V E R L O O K I N G / L O O K I N G O V E R N E O L I B E R A L I M M I G R AT I O N 847 else’s labour, and the social relations that occur among people when they are not alienated—characteristic of capitalism, ‘nation of immigrants’ rhetoric functioned as a fetish that mystified—one might say overlooked—exploitative social relations. The process of demystifying ‘nation of immigrants’ tropes in 1980s immigration law also contributes to a broad conversation about cultural studies of law. In her magisterial article, ‘Is There a Cultural Studies of Law?’, Rosemary Coombe asserts that the law may be ‘understood in Foucauldian terms as both a discourse (a coercive web of interconnecting disciplines of knowledge governed by a particular conception of rationality) and a set of institutions and institutional practices through which that discourse is made manifest’ (Coombe 2001, p. 39). Thus the law creates and diffuses certain forms of power that ‘constrain and enable agency in social life’ (Coombe 2001, p. 39). A cultural studies of law carefully considers local complexities in relations between power and meaning in daily life. This centrality of law to the cultural conditions of producing everyday life (Coombe, 2001, p. 55–56) is undeniable when considering immigration rights, given that all aspects of immigrants’ lives are carefully controlled and constructed by law and its varied institutional and social manifestations. This is, for instance, plainly indicated in the categories such as ‘immigrant’, ‘alien’, ‘refugee’, and ‘seasonal temporary worker’ that IRCA amnesty delineated and enforced, and, as such, differentially ascribed rights to. To demonstrate that immigration is a crucial area of inquiry for cultural studies of the law, and to demonstrate the efficacy of cultural studies methods in critical analyses of the law, this article looks over ‘nation of immigrants’ discourses surrounding IRCA amnesty as an important facet of the American neoliberal project.

#### The affirmative’s drive for diversity is an indoctrination for immigrants to come and make America seem more diverse, more multicultural – this advertisement and commodification of identity and culture contribute to the selling of a desirable, inclusive US.

Maher 15 (Justin T. Maher, September 2015, Vol. 47 Issue 4, p 980-998. 19p. “The Capital of Diversity: Neoliberal Development and the Discourse of Difference in Washington”, DC, online access article)

Complicating top‐down analyses of neoliberal development, this article charts how demographically diverse residents in Columbia Heights—a rapidly gentrifying neighborhood in Washington, DC—reinforce and resist dominant narratives of diversity that praise multicultural, mixed urban spaces. These narratives often not only fail to discuss power and equity, they are typically used to market state‐sponsored, upscale development that actively threatens the very diversity appropriated to sell a neighborhood. I argue that many residents initially reproduce this rhetoric of diversity, but discuss power and difference more candidly in their discussion of the neighborhood's history and amenities. Most residents who recently moved to the neighborhood juxtapose praise of diversity with comments that associate crime, litter, and “grime” with that diversity. Residents who grew up in Columbia Heights moved from praising the influx of development and new (largely upper‐middle class) residents to expressing concerns about exclusion, disrespect, and possible displacement. gentrification; multiculturalism; Washington; DC; urban development In a 2006 advertisement for the new Kenyon Square and Highland Park luxury condominium complexes, a young black man in a crisp polo shirt smiles off into the distance, presumably at the “world of great dining, entertainment and shopping” before him (Washington City Paper[ 36] ). Behind him, the distinctive Metro subway station sign lets us know that the “city's most vibrant new community” is Columbia Heights, a rapidly changing neighborhood in Northwest Washington, DC. The bold text proclaims: “Your Neighborhood, Your World.” The physical landscape of Columbia Heights itself echoes these images: colorful lamppost signs hang along the main 14th Street corridor, welcoming residents and visitors in English and Spanish, while a large banner advertisement featuring well dressed, racially diverse models towers over the side of the new Highland Park apartment complex. From the 1960s through the 1980s, Columbia Heights was a disinvested neighborhood, home primarily to low‐income residents of color. But with the arrival of a long‐delayed Metro subway stop in 1999, Columbia Heights began to see large‐scale private and public–private development along with an influx of upper‐middle class, white residents. Since 2006, a slew of new condominiums, restaurants, bars, boutiques, and big box stores have redefined the physical landscape. As the preceding examples show, this development has been dressed in the rhetoric of multicultural celebration, as developers seek to rebrand Columbia Heights as an attractive destination because of its diverse residents. But who is the “your” referenced in the Kenyon Square and Highland Park's marketing? Beyond the glossy multicultural texts, what kind of diversity is valued and what kind of diversity is devalued and policed in the neighborhood? While a racially diverse (though largely white) group of middle and upper‐middle class residents benefit from the recent “revitalization” of the neighborhood, low‐income residents of color not only lack the resources to enjoy new upscale amenities, they are also in danger of being priced out of their homes. In other words, this recent development threatens the very diversity used to market it. The story of difference and development is shaped by the texts that sometimes literally tower above the neighborhood, but the entry point of this study is through the residents themselves. Building off critical geographers’ central commitment to all residents’ “right to the city” (Mitchell [ 24] ) and “right to stay put” (Hartman [ 16] ), I explore how residents resist and reinforce dominant narratives of multiculturalism amidst uneven, neoliberal development. Through an ethnographic analysis of demographically diverse Columbia Heights dwellers, this article highlights how residents deploy discourses of difference on the ground and how residents’ daily interactions offer counter‐narratives that disrupt the dominant neoliberal “maps” that shape the built environment and promote uneven development. Whether they had moved to Columbia Heights within the last three years or been in the neighborhood for decades, residents I interviewed all praised the neighborhood's diversity. However, my ethnographic analysis reveals that, beyond that superficial praise, residents found ways to reveal the tension and uneven power relations that run throughout their diverse neighborhood. While many newcomers reinforced the devaluation of longtime residents of color, longtime residents constructed counter‐discursive narratives that both expressed their anger at their devaluation and asserted their right to be part of the neighborhood. Given that representations of a neighborhood are integral to speculation and development, I argue that we should conceptualize this as a form of material resistance. Disrupting the script has the potential to disrupt the process of selling Columbia Heights to those in the market for upscale amenities and multicultural neighborhoods scrubbed of the history and present‐day reality of race‐ and class‐based inequality. In our conversations, most residents who moved to the neighborhood within the last 10 years immediately juxtaposed comments about crime, litter, “grime”, and devalued property with their initial praise of diversity. Residents who grew up in Columbia Heights moved from praising the influx of development and new (largely upper‐middle class) residents to expressing concerns around exclusion, disrespect, and possible displacement. Residents’ sentiments about difference were most explicit in our discussions of resources, broadly defined from crime to trash pickup to retail amenities. In these conversations, incoming upper‐middle class residents often suggested that they deserved high‐quality (often leisure‐oriented) resources based on the prices they were paying to rent or own in the neighborhood. This consumption ethos was juxtaposed by longtime residents’ resignation and anger that—after fighting for quality amenities for decades—they were only able to enjoy them (if they could afford them) because more valued residents arrived. The desire to live in a diverse urban area is not inherently problematic and, in fact, may lead to more cross‐cultural understanding and recognition of existing inequality. Yet contact among demographically diverse residents in “mixed” communities, even when civil, does not always signal a shift in private attitudes about difference (Valentine [ 32] ). This ethnographic inquiry reads residents’ contradictions, juxtaposition, and euphemisms against pervasive neoliberal rhetoric that celebrates diversity without examining power, illustrating how they reinforce or challenge that rhetoric.

### Link – Diversity

#### The imbedding of cultural diversity from the state only reifies cultural hegemonic structures

Chan-Tibergien 06 (Jennifer Chan-Tibergien, Review of Education (2006) 52:89-1059 Springer 2006, DOt 10.1007/s 11159-005-5606-2, “CULTURAL DIVERSITY AS RESISTANCE TO NEOLIBERAL GLOBALIZATION: THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL MOVEMENT AND CONVENTION” accessed through online library) lz

The late 1990s saw a dramatic cultural turn in the international political economy. The incursion of the World Trade Organization (WTO) into culture through the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) since 1995 has raised alarms among cultural communities and nations. Behind the immediate question of whether cultural goods and services are different from other goods and hence merit protective measures in world trade lurks a more complex questioning of what culture signifies in the age of global capitalism. Is culture, by nature or application, capitalistic? Or can culture ground and redeem capitalism from its inherent crises? The tension between 'cultural capitalism' and 'cultural counter-hegemony' not only ignites but also divides a worldwide cultural diversity movement. This study raises two questions. Firstly, what is the "home discourse" (Bannerji 2000: 53) of "cultural diversity" as a response to neoliberal globalization? Secondly, in what ways can cultural diversity be re-imagined as narrative knowledges that re-territorialize and embed capitalism in a radically more pluralistic social space? It is argued that the culturalization of worldtrade politics through the proposed international instrument on cultural diversity does not necessarily challenge existing global capitalist hegemony. Indeed, such a new instrument, which is essentially centred on the state, might only reinforce the cultural hegemony of dominant states and capitalist hegemony through the use of culture as a tool of capitalism. To go beyond cultural capitalism - another "gigantism" (Roy, quoted in Bello 2002: 115) - that is, for culture to assert its counter-hegemonic role against neoliberal globalization, a new cosmopolitan culturalism, in the form of a multiplicity of narratives, can act as a living, "decolonizing methodology" (Smith 1999) and political resource (Young 2000) for individuals, communities, and nations to negotiate not only the terms of capitalism, but alternative livelihoods (cf. the concept of "social difference as political resource" in Young 2000 as well as the notion of community in Chatterjee 1993 as a cultural resource for people to negotiate the terms against the grand narrative of history). The purpose of such methodologies and resources is to provincialize neoliberal capitalism through an "insurrection of subjugated knowledges" (Foucault 1980) so that "the economy did not have to be thought of as a bounded and unified space with a fixed capitalist identity. Perhaps the totality of the economic could be seen as a site of multiple forms of economy whose relations to each other are only ever partially fixed and always under subversion" (Gibson-Graham 1996: 12). This study proceeds in three parts. Part I outlines the movement for an international convention on cultural diversity. Through a discursive analysis of the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity and a draft convention on cultural diversity by the nongovernmental International Network on Cultural Diversity, Part II deconstructs 'cultural diversity' as a new global ideology where the state remains the predominant representative embodiment of culture. Part III presents my argument on the role of cultural 92 Jennifer Chan- Tibergien narratives as a living methodology and political resources in the construction of a "heterogeneous public" (Young 1990) in overlapping levels of governance.

### Link – Productive Immigrants

#### Economic citizenship and exploitation is a priority for the state – the diverse, active, ‘ethnic’ citizen is shaped into a productive subject whose sole purpose is to bring prosperity to the nation state.

Simon-Kumar 14 (Rachel Simon-Kumar - School of Social Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand. Ethnicities, 2014, Vol. 14(1) 136–159 DOI: 10.1177/1468796812466374 etn.sagepub.com) lz

Economic citizenship A primary arena in which the notion of being ‘active’ is signalled in policy text, particularly for recent migrants, is in economic contribution. The New Zealand Settlement Strategy (2005), for instance, accords employment the highest priority in its settlement goals for new migrants, to facilitate migrants ‘to obtain employment appropriate to their qualification and [to ensure that they] are valued for their contribution to economic transformation and innovation’ (Department of Labour, 2005: 11). The emphasis on employment is neither unusual nor unexpected; certainly, scholarly critiques of post-neoliberal/Third-Way states have pointed to the subtext of ‘employability’ and ‘market readiness’ (Clarke, 2005; Levitas, 2005; Newman and Clarke, 2009). However, the added, and notable, feature of the active ‘ethnic’ citizen is, as the New Zealand Settlement Strategy notes, in their ability to contribute to economic transformation and innovation, i.e. ‘stimulating innovation and creativity in business and strengthening relationships between international and domestic markets’ (Department of Labour, 2005: 9). Thus, ethnic citizens are not merely expected to be individually economically active and independent; they are enjoined to be catalysts for growth in New Zealand. The notion of the ethnic citizen, particularly recent migrants, as enabling economic growth was widespread among the interviewees; as an illustration, the shared views of two participants, one official and the other a migrant, are reproduced below. Immigration is like an economic enabler... [what] we should be getting into is enabling employers to understand a little more than just welcoming people and making them feel comfortable. Maybe understand how that person might connect your business globally or might bring new ideas to your business. (government official, italics added) [If you go and tell the government that migrants are] not going to be costing the country any more ...we’re going to create a more vibrant nation, a nation which would be able to utilize its diversity in a similar form as most of the progressive and developed nations have used and an example is the United States. (representative of ethnic community, italics added) In the discursive frame of policy actors, then, the ideal ethnic migrant was a travelling repository of skills and knowledge, an entrepreneur, a connector, and an economic ambassador who would promote new ideas and be instrumental in fostering a knowledge economy while also generating new, lucrative contacts outside New Zealand.15 The ‘entrepreneurial’ ethnic citizen, a protagonist in New Zealand’s burgeoning global ambitions, is constituted at a propitious time in the country’s economic development. This idea of the ‘entrepreneurial’ ethnic citizen is supported by official policy discourse that sees the future of New Zealand tied to its diversity. In its pivotal document, ‘Towards an Inclusive Economy’, Clark’s Labour government noted both the intrinsic and the instrumental value of diversity: Diversity is important both as freedom for people to express their individuality or cultural aspirations, and instrumentally to make New Zealand a more interesting and stimulating place to live, facilitate new ideas and innovate behaviour, foster competition, raise productivity, and open new markets. (Inclusive Economy Working Group, 2001: 14, italics added) The Free Trade Agreement signed between New Zealand and China in 2008 exemplifies the benefits anticipated through the global connectivity sought after from ethnic citizens. What is worth remarking about these ideas is the unmistakable convergence of the political and the economic in a discourse of citizenship; for instance, Mervin Singham, the Director of the Office of Ethnic Affairs, promotes the idea of ‘Strength in Diversity’, a paradigm in which, ‘instead of seeing increasing ethnic diversity as a huge challenge, we could see ethnic community integration as a global talent management opportunity for us’ (Singham, 2006: 36, italics added). Singham’s ‘global talent management’ – the marrying of the economic with difference – draws on a contemporary rhetoric extolling the economic benefits of diversity but its extension into the political realm is part of a relatively recent move that binds globalization with citizenship. These entrepreneurial ethnic subjects are akin to the expatriate New Zealanders called on in Larner’s (2007) study of the KEA network to make good their overseas networks to engender an edge in global competitiveness. Like the expatriate community, the entrepreneurial ethnic citizen is indicative of the ‘new latitudes of citizenship’ prevailing in New Zealand (Ong, cited in Larner et al., 2007: 342). Also like the expatriate, the entrepreneurial citizen is constituted to undertake elite initiatives. Thus, as a subject, the entrepreneurial citizen is shaped by a particular political imaginary: these are not the unemployable, low-skilled, migrants on New Zealand’s social welfare; rather, these are affluent, established business people, operating transnationally. The favoured entrepreneurial ethnic citizen is a classed subject.16

### Link – Integration/Assimilation

#### Forced integration coincides with ideal Eurocentric stereotypes of normalcy.

Vang 12 (Zoua M. Vang is an Associate Professor (with tenure) in the Department of Sociology at McGill University. She is also the faculty founder and co-organizer of the Immigration, Race and Ethnicity (IRE) workshop at McGill which aims to provide an interdisciplinary, intellectual home for faculty, graduate students, and researchers from local universities and research centers in Montreal who are interested in issues of international migration, race and ethnicity. She received her BA in Sociology and Psychology (1999) from the University of Pennsylvania, and MA (2004) and PhD (2008) in Sociology from Harvard University. She spent two years as a National Science Foundation postdoctoral research fellow at the Population Studies Center at the University of Pennsylvania where she acquired additional training in racial/ethnic health disparities and maternal child health. May 2012, ANNALS, AAPSS, 641, “The Limits of Spatial Assimilation for Immigrants' Full Integration: Emerging Evidence from African Immigrants in Boston and Dublin”, Page 241, DOI: 10.1177/0002716211432280) lz

Residential integration between immigrants and nonimmigrants is typically considered a desirable goal in most pluralistic, immigrant-receiving countries. Far from being merely an abstract liberal principle, residential integration is championed by members of the dominant group because its absence (i.e., segregation) is misconstrued as a sign of unwillingness on the part of immigrants to adopt the culture, norms, and values of the host society. As such, residential segregation is believed to be an impediment to immigrants' full integration and, therefore, a threat to social cohesion. The belief that residential segregation can stymie integration is so strongly held in some Western European countries that governments have even gone as far as to socially engineer integration through various housing policies (Musterd and De Vos 2007). However, it does not necessarily follow that spatial proximity between immigrants and dominant group members will result in structural, marital, economic, civic, and other forms of assimilation. Conversely, a lack of residential integration with dominant group members does not mean that immigrants are doomed to a life of social exclusion either, especially if immigrants are able to attain residence in majority-minority neighborhoods that are not socioeconomically disadvantaged.

#### The requirement for assimilation forces immigrants to fit into socially acceptable niches in society imitated from their “white role models” creates the false narrative that status gets better as someone gets white and structurally ignores race based disadvantages – own that causes blame to be shifted onto the migrant.

Vang 12 (Zoua M. Vang is an Associate Professor (with tenure) in the Department of Sociology at McGill University. She is also the faculty founder and co-organizer of the Immigration, Race and Ethnicity (IRE) workshop at McGill which aims to provide an interdisciplinary, intellectual home for faculty, graduate students, and researchers from local universities and research centers in Montreal who are interested in issues of international migration, race and ethnicity. She received her BA in Sociology and Psychology (1999) from the University of Pennsylvania, and MA (2004) and PhD (2008) in Sociology from Harvard University. She spent two years as a National Science Foundation postdoctoral research fellow at the Population Studies Center at the University of Pennsylvania where she acquired additional training in racial/ethnic health disparities and maternal child health. May 2012, ANNALS, AAPSS, 641, “The Limits of Spatial Assimilation for Immigrants' Full Integration: Emerging Evidence from African Immigrants in Boston and Dublin”, Page 222-224, DOI: 10.1177/0002716211432280) lz

This article examines the sociospatial experiences of twenty-first-century African immigrants in Ireland and the United States—and locally, in Dublin and Boston. The cross-national comparison reveals important shortcomings with spatial assimilation theory and draws into question the generally accepted notion that residential integration is an important, intermediary substage in larger pro cesses of immigrant assimilation. By juxtaposing Ireland with the United States, the study problematizes our reflexive assumptions about the relation ships among socioeconomic status (SES), acculturation, race, residential segrega tion, and subsequent forms of assimilation. Spatial assimilation as a waij station Spatial assimilation was not one of the original subprocesses or stages of assimilation that Gordon (1964) outlined in his influential treatise on immigrant adaptation. However, it has since been recognized as an important substage in immigrants' progression toward full incorporation in receiving societies (Alba and Nee 1997; Marston and Van Valey 1979). Spatial assimilation theory posits that upon arrival in a new country, immigrants will initially reside in immigrant enclaves, usually located in poor sections of the inner city where housing is cheap. As immi grants improve their economic position and adopt the host society's lan guage, customs, norms, and values (a process known as acculturation), real and/ or subjective differences between themselves and dominant group members will disappear. Once social distance diminishes, the spatial gap between immigrants and nonimmigrants will also close. Figure 1 summarizes the spatial assimilation model. SES and acculturation are the drivers of residential integration. The arrow flowing from residential integration back to socioeconomic assimilation in the figure reflects the idea that spatial assimilation can further improve immigrants' socioeconomic success (e.g., by This content downloaded from 35.2.9.80 on Sat, 14 Jul 2018 19:11:18 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE LIMITS OF SPATIAL ASSIMILATION FOR IMMIGRANTS' FULL INTEGRATION 223 enhancing their social networks or simply by placing immigrants in closer geographic proximity to where the good jobs are located). It is believed that meaningful interpersonal relations are likely to develop once immigrants and majority group members share the same residential spaces. The formation of primary group relations with dominant group members is the hallmark of struc tural assimilation, the stage or subprocess that paves the way for full integration— namely, marital, identificational, behavioral receptional, attitudinal receptional, and civic assimilation (Gordon 1964). In the absence of residential integration, immigrants may not be able to achieve structural assimilation or other assimila tion outcomes (Massey and Mullen 1984). Race and residential segregation Spatial assimilation theory predicts that all immigrants, irrespective of race or ethnicity, will be able to achieve residential integration with the dominant group given sufficient acculturation and socioeconomic mobility. However, not all immigrants are able to follow the linear progression toward residential inte gration outlined by spatial assimilation theory. For black immigrants and Hispanic subgroups with significant African ancestry, race is a powerful mas ter status that constrains subgroups' residential mobility (Darden and Kamel 2000).1 Studies have shown that black immigrants tend to live in majority-minor ity inner-city neighborhoods where they are overrepresented (Freeman 2002) and have little opportunity for contact with white Americans (Crowder 1999). Moreover, black immigrants remain segregated from whites despite improve ments in SES and acculturation (Iceland and Scopilliti 2008). The general con sensus is that race is the defining factor in deciding the residential destinies of black immigrants in America. In fact, the persistent pattern of residential segre gation for black immigrants has led some scholars to forecast a grim future in which all blacks, irrespective of nativity status, face unparallel forms of social exclusion in American society (Iceland 2009, 13). It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which black immigrants' limited resi dential gains lock them in the lowest position in American society alongside African Americans given the overwhelming empirical research on the negative effects of racial residential segregation on a variety of outcomes, such as poverty, crime, unemployment, and ill health. Such somber scenarios are based on the idea that residential integration with middle-class white Americans is the missing link in the assimilation process for immigrants. However, it is not clear that resi dential integration and structural assimilation (or other forms of assimilation) are as intimately connected in the current era for contemporary black immigrants as they were for pre-1924 European immigrants and post-1965 Asian and white Hispanic immigrants. Even among the latter two contemporary migrant popula tions, there is some evidence to suggest that successful integration is no longer solely tied to spatial proximity to whites. In a critique of spatial assimilation theory and research, Wright, Ellis, and Parks (2005) questioned the use of whites as the reference group for assessing This content downloaded from 35.2.9.80 on Sat, 14 Jul 2018 19:11:18 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY whether immigrants have successfully integrated into American society. The authors argued that the trajectory of initial inner-city residence among conationals and eventual dispersion into suburbs with white Americans is but one of many possible spatial outcomes. Furthermore, immigrants' continued residence among conationals or other minority groups within central-city neighborhoods or in multiethnic suburban neighborhoods should not be regarded as somehow reflecting a lack of integration or an inferior form of residential attainment. Wright and colleagues found evidence to support their claim that the locational attainments of immigrants can still be considered a "success" even if improve ments in residential location do not entail proximity to whites. Using 1990 cen sus data for the greater Los Angeles area, the authors found a pattern of dispersion away from initial immigrant settlements over time as immigrants remain longer in the country. The dispersion away from immigrant enclaves did not translate into coresidence with whites. Rather, immigrants were spatially integrating with native-born conationals or coethnics, and this dispersion process often represented an improvement in neighborhood quality for immigrants. Although the authors did not examine black immigrants in their study, the main concepts and implications of their research apply to black immigrants as well.

### AT: Legalism Good

#### Legal remedies to immigration fail – our very legal system is premised on exclusion of Muslim/Middle Eastern individuals

Elver 12—Hilal Elver, Research Professor, and global distinguished fellow at the University of California Santa Barbara LA Law School Resnick Food Law and Policy Center, Ph.D. from the University of Ankara Law School, Special Rapporteur on Right to Food at the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2012 (“Racialization of Islam before and after 9/11: From melting pot to Islamophobia,” *Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems*, Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring 2012, p: 119-174, Available Online at <https://www.academia.edu/11934102/Racialization_of_Islam_before_and_after_9_11_From_melting_pot_to_Islamophobia>, Accessed 07-13-2018)//hk

Muslims in the United States became a suspicious, potentially dangerous category predominantly associated with active terrorism. As a first step, the U.S. government misused immigration laws “to craft a system of preventive administrative detention, imprisonment, and ultimately deportation of thousands of Muslim/Middle Eastern immigrant men.”99 Immigration law was the most effective tool to attack Muslim and Arab immigrants.100 The government used immigration courts freely and often because they provided fewer legal protections for the accused.101 Detainees do not have the right to an attorney and may be detained even after an immigration judge has ordered them freed on bond.102 “Authorities severely punished minor violations of Muslims and Arabs, while ignoring millions of other immigrants who flout the same law.”103 The approach is basically “to target the Muslims and Arab community with a kind of zero-tolerance enforcement.”104 “Officials [were] also using immigration charges to pressure people to provide information on Muslim organizations.”105 In times of national insecurity, immigrants, both resident aliens and citizens, are always politically vulnerable. According to Michael Posner, this has happened “throughout U.S. history, beginning with the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 . . . [and] in the 1850s, when the Know Nothing Party attacked Catholics, Jews, refugees and foreigners.”106 The last example was “during World War II, with Japanese internments. And it is true today, when Muslim Americans and individuals from the Middle East and South Asia are targeted officially and unofficially.”107 Post-9/11 events reminded many of the Japanese American civil liberties cases of Word War II.108 History clearly demonstrates that when a democratic government seeks a balance between security and liberty, targeting aliens from a nation or ethnic group defined as the enemy produces little public resistance.109 In the aftermath of 9/11 the U.S. “Justice Department detained more than twelve hundred people without charge and without a rational basis.”110 The FBI has questioned thousands, singling individuals “out for questioning based solely on racial, ethnic, or religious criteria.”111 In 2002, eighty-three thousand young Muslim men living in the United States—from twenty-five different countries—were forced to register, fingerprinted, and questioned by U.S. immigration officials. The program was soon dismissed because there was no effective way to gather information on such groups who had no suspicious activity in their lives other than being Muslim and living in the United States after 9/11.112 A later Justice Department study condemned this program, but the damage was done. It had already “caused enormous upset and distrust within the targeted communities.”113 Meanwhile, by way of new immigration laws, “thousands were detained in secret; . . . refused trials or hearings for months; interrogated under highly coercive conditions; held incommunicado and without access to lawyers; deported for wholly innocent political associations with disfavored groups; and detained indefinitely solely on Attorney General John Ashcroft’s ‘sayso.’”114 All of this is contrary to any due process rights contained in the Constitution of the United States.115 At the outset of the Iraq war, “the Department of Homeland Security announced that it would detain people who sought asylum in the United States from thirty-three countries,” and “almost all of them were Muslim countries.”116 The Department would not detain asylum applicants from other countries of the world.117

## RAISE Act CP

### 1nc RAISE Act CP

#### The CP solves by replacing the diversity visa system with the RAISE Act – key to high skilled workers

**Thadani 17** (Trisha Thadani, City Hall reporter for The San Francisco Chronicle. She previously covered work-based immigration and local startups for the paper’s business section. Thadani graduated from Boston University with a degree in journalism. Before joining The Chronicle, she held internships at The Boston Globe, USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, and was a Statehouse correspondent for the Worcester Telegram & Gazette, "What is the diversity visa lottery, and how might Trump replace it?", SFGate, 11-2-2017, accessed 7-8-2018, <https://www.sfgate.com/business/article/What-is-the-Diversity-Visa-lottery-and-how-might-12324576.php)> //AL

This program was started in 1990 as a way to bring foreigners into the U.S. from countries with low rates of immigration. The government issues up to 50,000 of these visas through a lottery each year, a tiny fraction of the millions who apply. During the application period for fiscal year 2017, about 19 million people applied for the U.S. diversity visa program, according to the Pew Research Center. The government is currently taking applications for the next fiscal year, with a deadline of Nov. 22. The visa has long been considered a “golden ticket” for those coming from countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, who don’t have family ties or a job offer in the U.S. To qualify, all a person needs is a high school education, two years of work experience and a passport from a country whose number of immigrants to the U.S. fell below a certain bar in a given government fiscal year. The qualifications are much less rigorous than those for other visas commonly used in Silicon Valley, like the H-1B, which requires a foreigner to have at least a bachelor’s degree and be paid a certain salary. Tech companies like Google and Facebook rely on H-1B visas to fill engineering positions, and have long complained about the limited number of visas available for high-skilled workers. Each year, 85,000 H-1Bs are allocated to for-profit companies through a lottery. H-1B holders often get stuck waiting for green cards for years because of the high volume of foreigners emigrating from those countries. Indian and Chinese citizens, who account for the majority of H-1B holders, are excluded from the diversity lottery. In theory, doing away with the diversity visa could benefit high-skilled immigrants by freeing up more green cards in the U.S., said Ed Litwin, a Bay Area immigration attorney. “While some (diversity visa recipients) could be professionals and could be very well-trained, that’s not a requirement,” Litwin said. “We need to have more availability to these international educated people that are at the cutting edge.” But, when Trump says he wants to do away with the diversity visa, he doesn’t necessarily mean he will reallocate those visas to the highest-skilled, said Stuart Anderson, executive director of the National Foundation for American Policy, a nonpartisan think tank. “Merit-based is purely a slogan,” Anderson said. “It’s not a serious effort to increase the amount of immigrants coming into the country.” Anderson added that the administration has a series of proposals that actually make it harder for certain high-skilled immigrants to come into the country. In August, the president endorsed the RAISE Act, which would slash legal immigration in half and establish a point system for those considered higher-skilled. Meanwhile, the administration is also scrutinizing several other Obama-era rules that help high-skilled foreigners live and work in the U.S. Some rules on the chopping block include those designed to benefit startup entrepreneurs, spouses of H-1B visa holders, and foreign students who graduated with a degree in scientific or technical fields. The administration has also issued a series of memos that have the effect of making it harder for H-1B applicants to qualify. “It would be more sincere to have a proposal that would take the numbers of the diversity visa and put them toward employment-based immigration,” Anderson said. “But all their advocacy is for fewer people coming in. Period.” Following the attack, Trump chided Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., because he supported the diversity visa program when it was enacted nearly 30 years ago. On Twitter, Schumer shot back: “President Trump should be focusing on the real solution — anti-terrorism funding,” he wrote. “Pres Trump, instead of politicizing & dividing America which he always seems to do at times of national tragedy, should bring us together.”

### NB – Base DA

#### The counterplan solves and shows bipartisan support

**Nowrasteh 17** (Alex Nowrasteh, "Diversity Visa Program Fixes that Should Satisfy Republicans and Democrats", Cato Institute, 1-20-2018, accessed 7-11-2018, https://www.cato.org/blog/diversity-visa-program-fixes-will-satisfy-republicans-democrats) //AL

Legalizing the DREAMers, building the wall, boosting border security, and reforming the diversity immigrant visa program are the components of a successful legislative deal to reopen the federal government. Reforming the diversity visa presents some unique challenges because Congress does not want to cut the number of green cards, but many Democrats–especially members of the Black and Hispanic Congressional Caucuses–worry that any substantial change to the program would diminish the number of immigrants from the nations that are favored under the current system. Fortunately, there is a policy solution that should satisfy both sides: convert the diversity visa into a merit-based system that still favors immigrants from the regions of the world that qualify for the diversity visa. Before explaining this reform idea and how it would satisfy both political parties, some background on the diversity immigrant visa program is necessary. This immigration category allocates 50,000 green cards annually to foreign nationals, distributed by lottery. These green cards go only to applicants from low-admission countries that sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the United States in the last five years. Lottery winners must have at least a high school education or demonstrate two years of work experience within the past five years in an occupation that requires at least two years of training or experience. Applicants must also pass the required health, crime, and national security checks. No more than 7 percent of all winners can come from any one country in a given year. The first portion of this reform idea would make many Republicans happy by canceling the diversity visa program and shifting those 50,000 green cards to a new merit-based green card category that would allocate the visas via a points system. The assignment of points under this immigration category is up to Congress, but copying the system outlined by Senators Tom Cotton (R-AR) and David Perdue (R-GA) in the RAISE Act would take a lot of ire out of their opposition. However, Congress should make some changes to the RAISE Act’s points scheme to prevent absurd outcomes. The diversity visa requirement that only 7 percent of the new green cards can go to applicants from any one country should also be removed to make it more meritorious. The green cards under this new category would then be allocated to applicants who get the most points, assuming they are eligible and meet some minimum point threshold. The second portion of this reform idea would make many Democrats happy by continuing to allocate these green cards to applicants from low-admission countries as defined under the law currently governing the diversity visa. By copying the diversity visa’s definition of low-admission countries, only foreign nationals from countries that sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the United States in the previous five years would be eligible for the new merit-based green card. This would guarantee that, at least initially, new immigrants under this merit-based points scheme would come from broadly similar countries as those who qualify for the current diversity immigrant visa program. Depending on the actual points system created by Congress, the specific immigrants from these countries would likely be more educated and fluent in English, but their countries of origin would be similar to those under the diversity visa program. Canceling the diversity immigrant visa program, transferring its green cards into a new merit-based points category, and only allowing applicants from low-admission countries to apply for those visas should satisfy most Republicans and Democrats who want a middle-ground solution that would reopen the federal government.

## Africa Brain Drain

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#### Africa brain drain low now, but increased brain drain can push us past the tipping point

**Racke, 7/18** – Immigration and Foreign Policy Reporter for the Daily Caller (Will, “Obama urges Africans to Stay in Home Countries, Stop ‘Brain Drain’,” Daily Caller, 2018, http://dailycaller.com/2018/07/18/obama-urges-africans-to-stay-home/)//vp

Former President Barack Obama on Wednesday encouraged young Africans to stay in their home countries rather than emigrate to more prosperous places, saying that **a new generation of leaders could reverse the “brain drain” that has hurt the continent’s development.** Speaking in Johannesburg, South Africa, Obama told a gathering of young African businesspeople and social activists they had an opportunity to create more meaningful change at home.“Precisely because there may be less of a concentration of talent, … your chances of being transformative are going to be higher,” he said, according to Reuters. Since leaving office, Obama has focused much of his attention on development in Africa, where population pressure, corruption and civil strife are causing heavy out-migration. His nonprofit group, the Obama Foundation, sponsors a leadership program aimed at helping talented Africans find solutions to the continent’s problems. Obama has deep familial ties to Africa — his father was born in Kenya and returned there to work as an economist after studying in the U.S. At his Johannesburg speech, Obama called on African governments to find ways of making it more attractive for bright students like his father to pursue their goals at home.“If we have African leaders, governments and institutions which are creating a platform for success and opportunity, then you will increasingly get more talent wanting to stay,” he said. “**Once you reach a tipping point, not only will you stop the brain drain, then it will start reversing.”** Increasing migration from Africa has become a major policy problem in recent years, as millions of Africans — mostly poor, young men — have sought better economic opportunities elsewhere, especially Europe. The influx of migrants has overwhelmed social welfare systems in many of the receiving countries and sparked a backlash against illegal immigration, boosting the fortunes of right-wing populist parties across the continent.

#### The plan accelerates brain drain – the DV program is one of the biggest pathways for African migrants

Thomas 11—Kevin J.A. Thomas, Associate Professor of Sociology, and Demography, and African Studies, Pennsylvania State University, PhD in Demography, University of Pennsylvania, 2011 (“What Explains the Increasing Trend in African Emigration to the U.S.?” *International Migration Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1, p 3-28, Spring 2011, Available Online at DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2010.00837.x, Accessed 07-08-2018)//hk

Trends in African emigration to the U.S., based on data on refugee migration and the immigrant visa database, are presented in Figure I. These trends show the mean number of immigrants by year, and type of migration, in the past one and a half decades. Appendix A shows summary measures describing the nonweighted number of emigrants from African countries with selected characteristics. According to Figure I, there was an approximately 300 percent increase in the number of African emigrants to the U.S. between 1992 and 2007. Yet, despite these increases, considerable variations are found in the trends associated with specific types of migration flows. For example, there were systematic annual increases in the migration of African refugees during the latter part of the 1990s. In fact, by the year 2000 African refugee migration was among the top two types of migration flows driving overall African emigration to the U.S. There were, however, abrupt declines in these trends between 2001 and 2002 as a result of the temporary suspension of the U.S. refugee resettlement program after the September 11 attacks (Bruno, 2006). However, these trends rebounded around 2003 ⁄ 2004 but have since been on the decline. Figure I also points to the possible impact of the DV program on overall African immigration trends. Although the program was enacted as part of the Immigration Act of 1990, the first DV immigrants arrived in the U.S. in 1995. As Figure I suggests, DV migration appears to increase the overall trend in the number of African immigrants from a mean of below 400 before 1995, to about 600 and above in the later half of the 1990s. African nationals are, however, less likely to emigrate to the U.S. as part of family-reunification processes or strictly for purposes of employment. At the same time, disparate trends are observed in African emigration for family or employment-related reasons. For example, the results show consistent increases in the mean number of Africans emigrating as the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. A possible explanation for these increases is that earlier cohorts of African immigrants may be increasingly fulfilling the residency requirement for U.S. citizenship thus becoming more legally eligible to sponsor the migration of their immediate kin. Emigration of nonimmediate family members, however, occurs on a much smaller scale. Contrary to expectations, few highly skilled individuals are emigrating from Africa to the U.S. through formal employment preferences. As Figure I suggests, trends in African emigration for employment reasons slightly declined between 1992 and 2007.¶ Results from the regression analysis of the determinants of overall trends are presented in Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used in the models are found in Appendix B. In Table 1, Model 1 only presents an estimate for the year coefficient, allowing us to capture the gross annual change in the overall emigration rate. The results indicate that on average emigration from Africa to the U.S. significantly increased by 6 percent per year between 1992 and 2007. This overall trend, according to Model 2, seems significantly associated with specific trends in at least two of the three major types of emigration flows, i.e., refugee migration and the DV migration. Yet, controlling for the influence of the three major flows results in only a slight reduction in the overall annual emigration trend. Model 2 further suggests that in absolute terms, DV migration had a greater average impact on overall trends than either refugee migration or the migration of immediate family members. In fact, the average contribution of refugee migration is about four times higher than the contributions associated with the other flows accounted for in Model 2.

#### Shortages of skilled workers and professionals pose serious structural crises to stability across the continent

Soergel 16—Andrew Soergel, senior reporter, 2016 (“Sub-Saharan Africa Bleeds Skilled Labor as 'Brain Drain' Continues,” US News and World Report, 10-07-2016, Available Online at <https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-10-07/sub-saharan-africa-bleeds-skilled-labor-as-brain-drain-continues>, Accessed 07-16-2018)//hk

BURIED IN THE International Monetary Fund's massive 289-page World Economic Outlook report released earlier this week is a small line about a big problem for the labor markets of sub-Saharan Africa.¶ A region of the world that the World Bank believed was home to more than 1 billion people in 2015 is suffering from what the IMF refers to as a "brain drain" as young, skilled workers depart from the region, leaving educated and technically proficient professionals in short supply.¶ The exodus of young, educated workers is taking a toll on a region where human capital is scarce, the report said. "The migration of highly skilled workers entails a high social cost, as is evidenced by the departure of doctors and nurses from Malawi and Zimbabwe, which may mean welfare losses beyond those that are purely economic."¶ Reasons for migration vary by country. The refugees that in recent decades have fled violence in Rwanda, for example, would be considered "humanitarian" migrants by the IMF. Those leaving countries such as Zimbabwe for better employment opportunities would be classified as "economic" or "voluntary" migrants.¶ It's unfair to paint the diverse economies of sub-Saharan Africa with the same brush. But regardless of one's reason for leaving, data clearly supports the notion that sub-Saharan African populations are shedding workers that could potentially serve as doctors, engineers and skilled employees domestically.¶ The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in 2013 estimated that one in nine people born in Africa with a post-secondary education had migrated to a developed nation outside of the African continent. The United State's own African-born population is believed to have doubled in each decade since 1970, according to the Census Bureau.¶ As a result, there aren't enough skilled workers to go around in many sub-Saharan African countries. The World Health Organization estimates Zimbabwe held only 0.08 physicians per 1,000 people in the country's population. Malawi in 2009 held only 0.019 physicians per 1,000 people, while Mauritania's concentration sat at 0.13.¶ For comparison's sake, the U.S. held 2.45 doctors per 1,000 people in 2011. A general lack of skilled and technically advanced workers such as doctors leaves countries susceptible to medical and infrastructural emergencies. This was highlighted in 2014 when the deadly Ebola virus ravaged Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea – which didn't have nearly enough in-house medical personnel to effectively treat and contain the epidemic. The most recent data from these three countries indicates they held no more than 0.1 physicians per 1,000 citizens.¶ Scott Firsing, who's currently an adjunct professor at the University of North Carolina's Wilmington campus and who spent nearly a decade working and conducting research in South Africa, broke down World Bank data in a January blog post for the London School of Economics and Political Science, noting that African migration doubled between 1980 and 2010, while the percentage of those migrants who elected to stay in Africa steadily declined.¶ But he says those estimates are far from all-encompassing.¶ "The problem is, the data is difficult to break down. The immigration between a lot of these countries is really nonexistent," Firsing says, "It's a statistical nightmare, this movement. People say there are more and more opportunities back in Africa, but what I found, particularly among my friends who went off to work in Australia … they're getting picked up left, right and center from Africa."¶ Part of the reason for migration, he says, is a lack of opportunity – both professionally and in the realm of education. He says it's common for young, aspiring professionals to travel to Europe, the U.S. or Australia to further their education.¶ "In Africa, you don't really see that connection between the private sector and the universities. You don't have government funding poured into the universities. You don't have the skilled professors at the universities," he says. "They don't have people to actually teach them. And if they do, they end up just leaving."¶ Even South Africa – a country that serves as a destination point for many African migrants from the north – is suffering the effects of a brain drain. Competition from China has "decimated" the country's once vibrant manufacturing sector, Firsing says, and other opportunities for skilled workers have left the country as industries requiring such expertise have dried up.¶ And for those who already left for school or work in other countries, it's often difficult to justify returning, he says. Remittance payments are still an important source of cash for many in sub-Saharan Africa, but even the most homesick and patriotic expats may find it difficult to return home.¶ "If they're in a pretty decent paying job and they're pretty settled, you know how it is. It's tough to say, 'Ok, let's pack up and make the move again.' It's taxing on money and emotions and all that," Firsing says.¶ The IMF report notes that there is some evidence of skilled African expatriates eventually trickling back to their home nations, bringing with them "new skills" to those economies. And the remittance payments others provide allow those living overseas to help address poverty and support their families in their home nation, even if they're not personally stimulating that labor market.¶ But the outflow of skilled labor and young people seeking higher levels of education is still worrying enough for the IMF to highlight. And migration out of Africa shows few signs of slowing down.¶ "[IMF calculations] suggest that [sub-Saharan Africa's] migrants in OECD countries could increase from about 7 million in 2013 to about 34 million by 2050," the report said, noting that slow population growth in developed nations means the ratio of such immigrants to a given country's population could "increase sixfold" over the next few decades.

#### African instability escalates and causes war

EA 18 – The East African (“EDITORIAL: East Africa cannot afford the price of instability,” Mar 6 2018, <http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/oped/editorial/434752-4330534-s1rmh9/index.html>, jwg)

Over the past decade, the Great Lakes region has relatively enjoyed peace and stability that has facilitated economic growth and expanded opportunities, improving living conditions for millions of people.

However, the region currently faces significant risks characterised by continuing emerging patterns of instability that could wipe out these gains.

The larger East Africa is facing mounting risks of unrest and violence as a result of a massive population displacements with thousands fleeing the Democratic Republic of Congo into Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania as tensions rise over intimidation and violence.

At least 23 people were killed recently in renewed fighting between ethnic groups in eastern DRC, days after clashes between the armies of DRC and Rwanda, neighbours who have had a tumultuous relationship.

Besides DRC, the region’s prospects for peace and stability are threatened by the prolonged political tensions in Burundi and South Sudan, which have already created a regional refugee crisis.

The current internal political tensions in Ethiopia also mean that Addis Ababa could set back regional efforts to bring stability in Somalia, a country that remains a fertile ground for terrorism. Already this week, Al Shaabab attacked two police camps in northeastern Kenya and killed four security personnel.

Moreover, despite members of the East African Community claiming to be actively involved in regional peacebuilding efforts, the region is increasingly looking fragile with governments consistently using the might of the police and justice system to repress political opposition.

There have been increasing reports of extrajudicial killings, harassment of the media and manipulation of the judicial system for political ends in EAC member states, meaning no country in the region has the moral authority to play the watchdog role.

While it is an open secret that countries in the region are culpable in some of the conflicts due to their strategic interests in South Sudan, DRC, Somalia and Burundi — which further complicates peace efforts — the cost of inaction is, and will be, overwhelming.

Yet if the current tensions across the region escalate, it may not only defuse a refugee time bomb but also raise the risk profile of the region, dampening its prospects as an investment and tourism destination.

The region must act with urgency and act decisively to avert further escalation of the refugee crisis and escalation of violence.

There is a role for countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and South Africa in addressing political instability in the region. Rwanda as the current chair of the African Union must take an upper hand by demonstrating leadership in galvanising regional efforts to resolve the crises. This will minimise foreign intervention which rarely solves conflicts in Africa.

The recent changes in leadership in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Angola; countries that have historically been active players in the DRC conflict, provide a golden opportunity by engaging in preventive diplomacy.

Intervention in DRC is critical and urgent being as it is at the heart of the fragile Great Lakes region, and conflict here could have a domino effect across the region. And perhaps more importantly, strengthening democratic accountability is key.

### 2nc Enviro Impact

#### African conflict escalation destroys local biodiversity

Buehler 18 – science writer and blogger, MSc Zoology (Jake, “War In Africa Is Killing More Than People,” Earther, Jan 10 2018, <https://earther.com/war-in-africa-is-killing-more-than-people-1821945559>, jwg)

Populations of large, wild herbivores aren’t doing that great. Some 60 percent of large herbivore species are threatened with extinction thanks to overhunting, poaching, and the depletion suitable habitat. Now, researchers have zeroed in on another human-driven source of trouble for these animals: armed conflict. In Africa, wildlife populations living in regions frequently embroiled in war cope poorly, and suffer substantial population declines.

In recent years, the bulk of armed conflicts have taken place in Africa and Asia—continents that also host the most large mammal species on the edge of extinction. This alignment of war and wildlife certainly seems like it could have major impacts large herbivore populations, but the effects haven’t been well studied. That’s why conservation ecologists Joshua Daskin and Robert Pringle, from Yale and Princeton Universities, respectively, decided to look at at African protected areas and compare known, long-term population trajectories of big herbivores with the relative degree and frequency of armed conflict.

A continent-wide examination of Africa’s protected spaces was a natural choice for the research team. As lead study author Daskin told Earther, the scientists had previously conducted research in Mozambique’s Gorongosa National Park, which lost more than 90 percent of its large mammal species during the nation’s 1977-1992 civil war—and has since rebounded to within 80 percent of its former glory.

“We wondered if the impacts of war on wildlife in Gorongosa were emblematic of its effects elsewhere,” Daskin said

The research team first dug into databases that revealed armed conflict events in and around more than 3,500 protected areas in fifty-one African countries. By standardizing nearly seventy years of conflict occurrence data (from 1946 to 2010), the researchers found an average number of “conflict-years” for each protected area. Continent-wide, seven out of ten protected areas overlapped with a conflict zone during these decades.

To determine how herbivore populations were affected in these conflict zones, the researchers scoured the scientific literature for fine-scale data on the population densities of various species. In the end, the researchers had comparisons between conflict scenarios and population trends for over 250 populations of thirty-six species living in 126 protected areas. The species in question ranged from elephants to antelope to buffalo.

The team also tested the impact of other factors on herbivore populations, like the intensity of the violence, the proximity to urban areas, and the body mass of the species in question.

The results, published today in the journal Nature, show just how vulnerable Africa’s most beloved and charismatic wildlife are to repeated human conflict.

Conflict frequency was the most effective and important predictor of wildlife population trends among all factors. The more often there was armed conflict, the heavier the toll was on local wildlife, with the highest-frequency conflict zones almost invariably causing populations to plummet. Interestingly, conflict intensity didn’t seem to have much influence; rather, the presence of any armed conflict was sufficient to adversely impact animal populations.

To Daskin, this is important information for any future conservation work to take place in conflict zones.

“Our study is the first to provide an estimate of the effects of war on wildlife over long time periods and large (continent-wide) spatial scales,” Daskin said. “This is useful when prioritizing funding for conservation, because it can improve the assumptions that researchers and conservation managers make when planning where to invest in conservation efforts.”

The exact reasons why war appears to negatively affects these herbivores remain a bit murky. Research published in 2016 suggests that much of the ecological impact of war comes from indirect effects, rather than the physical, violent act of war itself. Rhinos and gazelles likely aren’t casualties of weapons and military activity, but victims of the chaos that war leaves behind. The poverty caused when livelihoods are upended, and the breakdown of law enforcement and environmental regulation, all make incidents of poaching and habitat disruption more likely.

Whatever is behind war’s disastrous impact on African wildlife, the good news is that in most cases, it seems as though populations can rebound from the brink. Very few populations were wiped out permanently in this study. Post-conflict, there may be great opportunities for restoration initiatives, said Daskin.

For how to effectively manage wildlife populations when peace comes to a conflict zone, Daskin suggests we look to Gorongosa and its remarkable recovery as an example. A huge part of its success may come from how the park was managed in synchrony with development aid for humans.

“The few remaining wildlife were allowed to reproduce under the watch of park rangers who conduct anti-poaching patrols, but also in conjunction with critical human development programs,” Daskin said. “Providing socio-economic assistance helps alleviate the need for people to hunt wildlife.”

By enacting rapid interventions during ceasefires, the researchers contend that some of the indirect effects of conflict on wildlife may be eased, hopefully ensuring that these iconic, ecologically and economically vital species regain their lost numbers.

### 2nc Turns Case

#### Economic downturn in sending countries increases rates of emigration

Thomas 11—Kevin J.A. Thomas, Associate Professor of Sociology, and Demography, and African Studies, Pennsylvania State University, PhD in Demography, University of Pennsylvania, 2011 (“What Explains the Increasing Trend in African Emigration to the U.S.?” *International Migration Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1, p 3-28, Spring 2011, Available Online at DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2010.00837.x, Accessed 07-08-2018)//hk

Most explanations for African migration to Western destinations are generally framed within the context of neo-classical migration theory. Originally developed to explain internal-migration movements, the theory considers migration as product of wage differentials between origin and destination countries (Hatton and Williamson, 2002; Rooth and Saarela, 2007). Specifically, neo-classical migration theory hypothesizes that international migration occurs as a result of the desire of migrants from low-wage or labor-surplus countries to move to high-wage or labor-scare countries (Massey et al., 1998). Accordingly, palpable income differences between Africa and the U.S. undergird the appeal of neo-classical explanations in contemporary Africa migration research. Indeed, considerable increases in African emigration to the U.S. occurred during much of 1980s, which was a period of declining African economic performance, otherwise referred to as the lost decade (Michaels, 1992 ⁄ 1993; Easterly, 2001; Hope, 2002). Wilson and Habecker (2008) thus identify the failure of economic development in Africa as a crucial determinant of contemporary African emigration to the U.S. Likewise, Hatton and Williamson (2003) argue that slow economic growth increases the pressure to migrate from Africa to high-income countries. Africa’s economic failures are also associated with the lack of basic infrastructure, increasing poverty, and high levels of unemployment (Lugalla, 1997; Potts, 2000; Kates and Dasgupta, 2007). One consequence of these transformations is that Africans now dream ‘‘of enjoying the better life in the U.S.’’ (Nwoye, 2009:96), or expect to migrate to other destinations in the West to achieve their desired higher living standards (Van Dalen, Groenewold, and Schoorl, 2005).¶ Increasingly, neo-classical type explanations are also being used in research on contemporary trends in skilled migration, or the ‘‘braindrain,’’ from Africa to the U.S. (Marchal and Kegels, 2003; Mullan, 2005). As some studies imply, when wages are higher in destination than origin countries, emigration flows are likely to be dominated by highly skilled migrants (Rooth and Saarela, 2007). Underscoring this nexus is Hagopain’s et al. (2004), observation that most of the 5,000 African doctors living in the U.S. are from the continent’s poorest countries. Other scholars even argue that contemporary African migration to the U.S. is, in fact, dominated by highly skilled Africans. For example, Carrington and Detragiache (1999) maintain that 74 percent of all African immigrants in the U.S. are highly educated individuals.

### 2nc Link Wall

#### The Diversity Visa program is an instrument of US power that manipulates potential migrants

Thomas 11—Kevin J.A. Thomas, Associate Professor of Sociology, and Demography, and African Studies, Pennsylvania State University, PhD in Demography, University of Pennsylvania, 2011 (“What Explains the Increasing Trend in African Emigration to the U.S.?” *International Migration Review*, Vol. 45, No. 1, p 3-28, Spring 2011, Available Online at DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-7379.2010.00837.x, Accessed 07-08-2018)//hk

Zolberg’s (1989, 1999) theory on the state’s control of migration processes provides another perspective through which African emigration to the U.S. could be understood. His basic premise is that migration flows are a product of the immigration laws of states (Zolberg, 1999). States, for example, can set numerical limits on immigrant admissions and determine the characteristics of immigrants allowed to live within their borders. Thus, as the historical evidence demonstrates, the first phase of African migration to the U.S. was brought to an end by state laws abolishing the legal trade in slaves. Similarly, the U.S. state, through the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, abolished pre-1960 immigration quotas, thereby providing new opportunities for Africans to emigrate to the U.S. Yet, the evidence suggests that this action resulted in limited increases in African migration to the U.S. immediately following the 1960s compared with the increases observed at the end of the century. More generally, a number of scholars (e.g., Lobo, 2001; KonaduAgyemang and Takyi, 2006) argue that the surge in African immigration to the U.S. reflects the impacts of the U.S. Diversity Visa (DV) Program created as part of the 1990 immigration reforms. This program, which seeks to increase immigration from nontraditional sending countries, was implemented in the mid-1990s and has facilitated the migration of approximately 20,000 Africans per year since its inception (KonaduAgyemang and Takyi, 2006). Conceptually, however, the legal framework of destination states does not preclude variations in migration trends between origin and destination countries. These variations can occur, for example, as a result of structural changes in origin countries that affect the incentive to migrate across time.¶ World Systems theory (Wallerstein, 1974, 1980) also provides useful insights into the likely determinants of African migration to the U.S. As Massey et al. (1998) note, early proponents of the theory focused on the ‘‘brain-drain’’ as a product of Western exploitation of developing countries. However, the dynamics of African emigration to the West can also be understood within the context of two further implications of the World Systems theory. The first stems from the fact that the theory considers migration to be a product of the penetration of capitalist economic relationships into less-developed countries. Accordingly, as wealthy multinational corporations penetrate poorer countries (e.g., those in Africa) they create mobile populations through processes of labor displacement (Massey et al., 1998). Secondly, World Systems theory also suggests that emigration from Africa to the West is driven by cultural and ideological linkages created by the latter during the period of colonial rule in Africa (Fonseca 2000; Thierry, 2004; Castles and Miller, 2009). Linkages created by British Colonialists, for example, resulted in the adoption of English as the official language spoken in their former colonies in Africa. Given the role of linguistic proficiency in determining postimmigration success, World Systems theory would hypothesize that contemporary African migration to the U.S. will be driven by emigration flows from English than non-English-speaking African countries.

#### There is a direct correlation between an increase in DV-based immigration and deteriorating economic conditions in sending countries

Jones 09—Adzele K Jones, 2009 (“Togo on my Mind,” *The New African Diaspora*, Indiana UP, 2009, ISBN 978-0-253-35337-5, p. 61-77, Accessed 07-08-2018)//hk

Although most Africans migrate to Europe, mainly because of lasting colonial ties, recent records have shown a great trend of African migration to the United States. This trend is especially true for Togo. In the past, since Togo’s offi cial language is French, most Togolese traveled primarily to France and to other French- speaking countries. Others sought opportunities in Germany, the earlier colonial power. There was a relatively small number of Togolese immigrants in the United States. But this number has shown a substantial increase since the late 1990s. The graph below shows the scale of deviation from the average for Togolese and African immigrants to the U.S. from 1995 to 2004. It indicates that, in more recent years, there has been a relatively greater increase in Togolese immigrants than in those from the general African population.¶ Although migrants may leave their homeland in search of better opportunities elsewhere, the country in which they settle also benefits from their presence. In fact, many countries campaign and employ strategies to attract them. As Gumisai Mutume states, industrial countries need migrants because they often face labor shortages in highly skilled areas such as information technology and health services, as well as for trade jobs in agriculture, manufacturing, and construction (Mutume 15). On the whole, Africans who immigrate to the U.S. or Europe are usually well- educated or skilled professionals.¶ According to Rotimi Sankore, the U.S. Diversity Visa Program recruits skilled and educated Africans (4). It is estimated that 30 percent of sub- Saharan Africa’s highly skilled workers and professionals left their countries for Europe and the United States between the years of 1960 and 1989. In addition, a third of all college graduates left the continent. As Gordon points out, 20–50 percent of skilled and professional Africans leave the continent, while the less skilled migrate to neighboring countries (86). It is reported by Hal Kane that there are more Togolese doctors in France than in Togo (39).¶ Africans enter the United States in many ways. Besides the regular applicant groups such as students, visitors, and sponsored relatives, immigrants have the opportunity to come to the U.S. through the lottery and diversity programs offered by the government. These programs are designed to recruit immigrants with professional skills and education so they contribute to the advancement of their targeted communities. The diversity program in 1995 gave 20,200 visas to Africans. This was about 37 percent of all available visas. This increase coincided with Africa’s deteriorating economic and political conditions (Gordon 89). For example, the years of greater increase in Togolese immigration to the United States coincide with the years of greater political unrest in the country. The graph below illustrates the percentage deviation from the average for Togolese and African refugees coming to the U.S. between 1995 and 2004. It also shows a more than 300 percent deviation above the average of Togolese refugees between 1998 and 1999. This profi le matches the years Amnesty International reported political unrest and massacres in Togo.

### 2nc Yes Brain Drain

#### Increased emigration drains African countries of vital professionals

Okeke 08—Godwin Okeke, Federal University of Technology Owerri, Department of Mathematics, 2008 (“The Uprooted Emigrant: The Impact of Brain Drain, Brain Gain, and Brain Circulation on Africa's Development,” *Trans-Atlantic migration: the paradoxes of exile*, 01-01-2008, Available Online at <http://www.academia.edu/1285833/_The_Uprooted_Emigrant_The_Impact_of_Brain_Drain_Brain_Gain_and_Brain_Circulation_on_>

Africas\_Development, Accessed 07-08-2018)//hk

There is a problem with conflicting figures among the data available on brain drain in Africa. From statistics made available by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Africa has already lost one third of its human capital and has continued to lose its skilled personnel at an ever increasing rate, and an estimated 20,000 doctors, university lecturers, engineers and other professionals have left the continent annually since 1990. There are also currently over 300,000highly qualified Africans in the diaspora, out of which 30,000 have Ph.Ds. Ironically, with these abundant human resources, Africa spends USD 4.0 billion per year (which represents 35 per cent of the total official development aid to the continent) as remunerations for some100,000 western experts who perform functions that are generically described as technical assistance.¶ This dilemma is represented in the table below, based on the estimates from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, (UNECA).¶ EMIGRATION OF SKILLED AFRICANS TO INDUSTRIALIZEDCOUNTRIES (BASED ON IOM AND ECA ESTIMATES)¶ The depressing fall-out from the above figures is that in Gabon, for instance, an estimated 90 per cent of the private firms are managed by expatriates, and the whole of Africa counts only 20,000 scientists (which represents 3.6 percent of the world total) following from which its share in the world’s scientific output has fallen from 0.5 percent to0.3 per cent, with the continuous suffering from the brain drain of scientists, engineers and technologists. This has resulted in serious human capital alarm in Africa, with Ethiopia, Nigeria and Ghana, ranked in that order leading the human capital loss.¶ The breakdown of IOM’s statistics shows that in Ethiopia, over the past10 – 15 years, about 50 percent of their people who went abroad for training did not return after completing their studies. Again, Ethiopia lost about 74.6 of its human capital from various institutions between1980 and 1991. It is so bad that while Ethiopia has one (1) full-time Economics Professor, they have more than 100 Economists in the USA alone. In the case of Nigeria, the estimates from the Presidential Committee on Brain Drain, set up in 1988 by the Babangida administration, show that between 1986 and 1990, Nigeria lost over10,000 academics from tertiary education institutions alone. It is also estimated that over 30,000 highly skilled personnel left the country including the public, industrial and private organizations. More so, 64per cent of Nigerians in the USA aged 25 and older have at least a bachelor’s degree. With regard to Zimbabwe, in 1997 alone, more than 1,000 professionals left Zimbabwe, and the Zimbabwe National Association of Social Workers estimates that 1,500 (50 percent) of the country’s 3,000 trained social workers left the country for the UK in the last 10 years. In Kenya, it costs about USD 40,000 to train a doctorand USD10,000 – 15,000 to educate a university student for 4 years. In essence, the African countries generally fund the education of their nationals only to see them end up making contributions to the continual growth of advanced and developed economies with little or no return on their investment.¶ From all indications, the worst hit is the health sector. Kenya, for instance, loses an average of 20 medical doctors per month. Ghana lost 60 percent of its medical doctors in the 1980s, while between 600and 700 Ghanaian physicians are currently practicing in the US alone, and this figure represents roughly 50 per cent of the doctors in Ghana. In 1993, the UNDP Human Development Report showed that over 21,000 Nigerian medical doctors were practicing in the USA alone, while Nigeria has an acute shortage of doctors. When we add the other Nigerian doctors in diaspora e.g. in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Europe, Canada, Australia and those scattered all over other African countries, the figure could be 30,000 (Brain Drain in Africa: Facts and Figures, Ibid: It is noted that these figures is a gross under-estimation of the facts on the ground).¶ In Ethiopia, one-third of its medical doctors have already left the country. As Randal Tobias, the US Government’s Global AIDS Coordinator, states, “there are more Ethiopian-trained doctors practicing in the city of Chicago alone than in Ethiopia. In Zambia the situation is not better off, as only 50 out of the 600 doctors trained in the country’s medical school from 1978 – 1999 could be retained- by the public sector. According to a story focused on Ghana which is generalized to the whole of the continent, the medical staff have been “lured” away to work in the USA and Britain thereby crippling Ghana’s health service. As it were,¶ Its (Ghana’s) training school turns out almost100 nurses a year – to be sucked up by the West, lured by the ten-fold salaries. Almost 1,000 nurses and 150 doctors have left Ghana for the UK in the past six years, and the flow is accelerating. Hundreds more have gone to the US, Australia and other countries in a mass migration fuelled by the worldwide demand for medical staff..

### 2nc Development Impact

#### The impacts of brain drain are widespread and structural

Capuano and Marfouk 13—Stella Capuano, empirical economist at the Institute for Employment Studies, she has conducted large-scale macro data collection on international migration in OECD countries, PhD in economics from the University of Turin, and Abdeslam Marfouk, Center for Ethnic and Migration Studies, (CEDEM), University of Liege and IWEPS, 2013 (“African Brain Drain and Its Impact on Source Countries: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?” *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2013, p. 297-314, Available Online at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13876988.2013.813122>, Accessed 07-16-2018)//hk

One of the major concerns regarding the emigration of the highly educated labor force from Africa is the potential loss of the investment directly associated with training. Nowadays, these fears are widespread, not only among scholars, but also among policy makers and international and regional development agencies. For example, the WHO General Director considered that “countries need their skilled workforce to stay so that their professional expertise can benefit the population. When health workers leave to work elsewhere, there is a loss of hope and a loss of years of investment” (WHO, 2006, p. 8).7 No comprehensive data documenting the amount of the training costs of skilled African migrants exist. However, different sources suggest that those costs might be substantial. For example, the UNCTAD has estimated that each African professional migrant represents, on average, a loss of US$184,000 to Africa (see, among others, Oyowe 1996; Pang et al. 2002; Eastwood et al. 2005; Kirigia et al. 2006; Mugimu 2010). Despite the fact that this estimate is widely cited, we should keep in mind that it has not been updated in more than 15 years. Consequently, it should be considered as an approximation. A number of case studies quantify the losses for African countries associated with the migration of the highly skilled. For example, the financial cost due to the migration of 600 South African medical graduates to New Zealand was estimated at US$37 million (Mugimu 2010). The total cost of education from primary to university of a non-specialist medical doctor in Malawi was estimated at US$56,947 (Muula and Panulo 2007) and 65,997 US dollars for Kenya (Kirigia et al. 2006).8 In 2004, Ghana alone lost approximately £35 million spent on training of health professionals who left the country for the UK. In contrast, the recruitment of Ghanaian doctors resulted in approximately £65 million of savings in training costs in the UK between 1998 and 2002 (Mills et al. 2008). From the point of view of the receiving countries, Saraladevi et al. (2009, p. 62) note that in the United Kingdom, “each qualifying doctor costs £200,000–£250,000 and 5–6 years to train, so in economic terms, every doctor arriving in the United Kingdom is appropriating human capital at zero cost for the use of the UK health services and the effect is immediate rather than in 5 years’ time”. In addition to the waste of resources invested in education, the early literature on the brain drain supports the view that skilled migration has several negative effects on the source countries (see, among others, Bhagwati and Hamada 1974; Kwok and Leland 1982). There are four main messages delivered by the traditional literature: (i) the brain drain deprives developing countries of one of their scarcest resources, i.e. human capital; (ii) skilled migrants are net fiscal contributors and their departure represents a fiscal loss for their home countries; (iii) human capital is a source of economic growth and the brain drain negatively affects the countries’ economic performance and growth prospect; and (iv) the decrease in human capital seriously affects the countries capacity for innovation and the adoption of modern technologies and increases inequality at the international level, with rich countries becoming richer at the expense of the poor countries. More recent literature mitigates the above pessimistic view by putting forward several potential compensatory effects of the brain drain. The channels through which these effects may take place are different. For example, return migration can be a beneficial route if returning migrants use the additional knowledge acquired abroad to start up new entrepreneurial activities and contribute to the diffusion of new technology (Stark et al. 1997; Gubert and Nordman 2008; Wahba and Zenou 2009). Other scholars argue that highly skilled migrants promote bilateral trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) between countries of origin and destination through the creation of business networks (see Harris and Schmitt 2003 for a survey and Blanes 2005 for a case study focusing on Spain). Furthermore, Wahba and Zenou (2009) found that Egyptian return migrants are more likely to become entrepreneurs than non-migrants. Gubert and Nordman (2008) reached similar conclusions for return migrants to the Maghreb. Moreover, remittances can help poverty reduction. Studies conducted focusing on African countries show that remittances can favor the development of the source country (Adams et al. 2009). Other studies have documented a beneficial effect of remittances on education and poverty reduction (see, for example, Sasin 2008; Herrera et al. 2008; Roushdy et al. 2009). However, Faini (2007) argues that as skilled migrants come, in general, from wealthy families,9 their propensity to remit is relatively lower. Consequently, the negative impact of the brain drain on source countries might not be mitigated by the favorable effect of remittances. Another important strand of literature, which Faini (2003) labeled the “revisionist” approach to the analysis of the brain drain, has put forward the concept of brain gain as a potential beneficial effect of highly skilled migration. For example, Mountford (1997); Stark et al. (1997); Vidal (1998); Beine and Docquier (2001) and Beine et al. (2001) argue that if returns to education are higher abroad than at home, the prospects of migration might increase the expected return of human capital, thereby stimulating human capital formation among residents in source countries. As long as only a fraction of the increased highly skilled labor force end up migrating (due to migration uncertainty), the source country’s long-run stock of human capital might be higher than it would have been without migration opportunities. When the incentive effect described above (the brain gain) dominates the observed brain drain effect, we can talk about a net brain gain for the source country. Beine et al. (2008) found that there are countries which benefit from the brain drain, “the winners”, in the authors’ terminology, and countries which experience a net loss of human capital, “the losers”. However, the latter are a larger number than the former and their losses are higher than the gains of the winners. Net gains are obtained in large countries which combine low levels of human capital and low high-skilled emigration rates, while among the losers there are many small African countries characterized by low per capita income (strong financial constraints to education) and high rates of skilled migration. Other studies focusing on the impact of migration of health personnel found that the medical brain drain has a detrimental effect on public health, measured as the rate of adult death and infant child mortality (for example, Bhargava et al. 2011). The evidence for the possible existence of a medical brain gain is mixed. Chojnicki and Oden-Defoort (2010) found that there might be a brain gain for most African countries, given the positive impact of the medical brain drain on the number of graduates from medical schools. However, Bhargava et al. (2011) argue that the effect is likely to be too small to compensate for the losses caused by the migration of highly skilled medical professionals. It would then be important, from the policy perspective, that those African countries which are hit the hardest by the medical brain drain phenomenon try and implement policies that mitigate the bad economic conditions for physicians, which represent the main causes of their emigration (see Clemens and Pettersson 2006). We should keep in mind that the conclusion emerging from these empirical studies should be interpreted with caution, as their results may differ according to the methodology and data use. For example, Beine et al. (2001) found a positive net gain for developing countries as a whole (+2.2 per cent of tertiary graduates), however Docquier et al.’s (2008) conclusion is more pessimistic: the number of “winners” is very limited and, more significantly, the brain drain has a negative effect on the total number of the tertiary educated in developing countries (–2.7 per cent tertiary graduates).

### AT: Brain Gain

#### Distrust claims of brain gain—our methodology is the least suspect and the most comparative

Capuano and Marfouk 13—Stella Capuano, empirical economist at the Institute for Employment Studies, she has conducted large-scale macro data collection on international migration in OECD countries, PhD in economics from the University of Turin, and Abdeslam Marfouk, Center for Ethnic and Migration Studies, (CEDEM), University of Liege and IWEPS, 2013 (“African Brain Drain and Its Impact on Source Countries: What Do We Know and What Do We Need to Know?” *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2013, p. 297-314, Available Online at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13876988.2013.813122>, Accessed 07-16-2018)//hk

It is worth noticing that the theoretical and applied works on the brain gain may suffer from different shortcomings. First of all, there is a fundamental argumentation flaw: brain gain research tends to refer always to developing countries, highlighting how the brain drain may raise the stock of human capital in the source countries. However, there is surprisingly little support for this idea when it comes to high-skilled emigration from developed countries. On the contrary, the prevailing perspective remains the one of interpreting the emigration of highly skilled people from Europe as a negative phenomenon. The best illustration can be found in the Third European Report on Science and Technology in which the European Commission (2003, p. 225) emphasizes: It is common to present the emigration of European students and researchers as a threat to Europe’s competitiveness in scientific fields and applied research. The exodus of highly qualified scientists and engineers, often described as “brain drain”, may weaken the field of research in Europe, while strengthening the continent’s main competitor, the US. In same report, the European Commission (2003, p. 222) points out: The loss of human resources to the US may put a strain on national education systems and place EU employers in a position where there is severe competition with their US counterparts for S&T personnel. A more serious consequence could be that the drain of EU based talent and skills leads to a further relative strengthening and growth of knowledge-intensive industries in the US. If the brain gain is a general theory, it should lead to the same conclusions regardless the countries of origin to which it applies. More importantly, we should also take into consideration that the analysis of brain gain may suffer from different shortcomings. First of all, the emigration rate should, ideally, be calculated as a ratio of the emigrant to the origin countries’ native population. However, because the datasets the authors use do not contain information on the structure of immigration in the origin country by educational level, the computation of the emigration rate is based on total resident population (natives + immigrants) instead of native population. As a consequence, the magnitude of the brain drain might be underestimated, to a large extent, for countries where immigrants represent a significant proportion of the resident population.10

### AT: 10 year plan thumper

#### The 10-year plan is doomed – Africa doesn’t have the technical skills to carry it out – brain drain is at critically low levels

**Kigotho, 2/9** – Reporter for the University World News (Wachira, “African Union devises 10-year plan to stem brain drain,” University World News, 2018, <http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20180209080048133)//vp>

The issue is that the African Union is worried that the continent’s lagging behind in availability of **critical technical skills and specialists** is almost an emergency. According to the African Union’s position paper, African Critical Technical Skills: Key capacity dimensions needed for the first 10 years of Agenda 2063, produced by the African Capacity Building Foundation, the single biggest challenge to ownership of Africa’s development agenda is grounded in severe shortages of experts with critical technical skills. Even then there are no indicators that most countries are harnessing their human capital stock. According to the paper, current higher education in Africa is heavily focused on non-critical technical skills areas. “If this pattern continues, the continent is likely to continue having more non-critical technical skills graduates between 2020 and 2030,” says the position paper. For instance about 300 qualified engineers leave South Africa every year, according to the African Union’s study, Capacity Development Plan Framework: The Africa we want, effectively leaving the country with fewer than three civil engineers per 100,000 people. A similar situation occurs in Kenya where they are only about 7,220 engineers in a population of 46 million people that translates to a ratio of 0.155 engineers per 1,000 persons. The situation is more critical in Tanzania where there are only 2,615 engineers in a population of over 55 million people. “In Africa, there are only 55,600 engineers out of a population of 1.2 billion persons but the continent ought to have 4.3 million engineers,” says the study.

## Base DA Links

### 1nc

#### Trump’s base support is a result of his promises to remove the diversity visas program – the plan betrays his campaign

**Frej et al 17** (Willa Frej, Elise Foley, and Lydia O’Connor, HuffPost reporter based in London. Fluent in French and proficient in Spanish and Arabic, she focuses on international news and refugee-related issues. Willa is a graduate of Yale University, "Trump Blames NYC Attack On Diversity Visa Lottery Program", HuffPost, 11-1-2017, accessed 7-14-2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-new-york-terrorist-attack\_us\_59f90649e4b00c6145e26e19) //AL

President Donald Trump said Wednesday, one day after a deadly attack struck New York City, that he would push to eliminate the diversity visa lottery program “as soon as possible.” The suspect in Tuesday’s attack, 29-year-old Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov, used the visa lottery program to legally emigrate from Uzbekistan in 2010, the Department of Homeland Security confirmed. “I’m going to ask Congress to immediately initiate work to get rid of this program,” Trump said in remarks at the White House. ”‘Diversity lottery’ sounds nice. It’s not nice. It’s not good. It’s not good. It hasn’t been good.” The president said he would also push to end “chain migration,” a phrase that immigration restrictionists use to describe allowing immigrants to sponsor their family members to join them in the U.S. Trump said Saipov sponsored others to immigrate to the country. “We want people that are going to help our country,” Trump said. “We want people that are going to keep our country safe. We don’t want lotteries where the wrong people are in the lotteries.” “And guess what? Who are the suckers that get those people?” he added, seemingly referring to the U.S. Trump called Saipov an “animal” and said he would consider sending him to Guantanamo Bay, a detention facility where alleged perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks have remained on trial for years. Restrictionists have for years targeted the lottery, which provides legal pathways for people from countries with historically low immigration rates to the U.S., making it an ideal target for Trump. Established in 1990, the lottery provides only 50,000 visas annually, and applicants are required to have completed at least a high school education or at least two years of work experience. Visas are distributed among nationals from six different regions. Trump is backing a bill that would end the diversity visa lottery program and cut other forms of family-based routes to come to the country legally, with the explicit goal of halving legal immigration. Eliminating the lottery was also included on a lengthy list of policy demands that the president sent to Congress last month. Trump laid out the requests after eliminating a program that protects young undocumented immigrants who came to the U.S. as children and saying he would sign a bill to let them stay in the country only if he was granted other policy concessions. Trump has called for slashing legal immigration by moving to a “merit-based” system that would allow fewer people to come to the U.S. based on family ties or through the visa lottery. He did so again on Wednesday. Trump called the lottery program a “Chuck Schumer beauty,” piggybacking off of other right-wing attacks on the Democratic senator from New York, who was one of the people to introduce the bill. He also sponsored the larger immigration bill that ultimately passed. Schumer shot back Wednesday, saying in a statement that Trump “should be focusing on the real solution ― anti-terrorism funding ― which he proposed cutting in his most recent budget.” Schumer helped push for the creation of the diversity visa lottery, but he also co-authored a bill that would have ended it. In 2013, he was part of the so-called Gang of Eight who drafted a bill that would have granted a path to citizenship to many undocumented immigrants, dramatically ramped up border security efforts and overhauled legal immigration. The bill passed the Senate but never got a vote in the House. Sen. Jeff Flake (R-Ariz.), another member of the Gang of Eight, came to Schumer’s defense on Wednesday by pointing out that the 2013 bill “did away with the Diversity Visa Program as part of broader reforms.” “I know, I was there,” Flake tweeted. Trump likely tagged “Fox & Friends” in one of his tweets because Sebastian Gorka, a former assistant to the president, appeared on the show Wednesday morning to discuss the visa program and advocate for its revision. “The idea that we’re just going to ― if you got a high school diploma and two years of work experience, we can roll the dice and can you come into America and it’s not based upon whether or not you are [a] strength [to] the nation ― that has to end,” Gorka said. He mentioned countries like Australia and New Zealand, which he claimed have “incredibly stringent immigration requirements” based on education. “No more political correctness,” he continued. “Political correctness can kill people.” Advocates of lower immigration levels frequently cite Australia’s merit-based system, but the country actually accepts far more immigrants as a percentage of its population than the U.S. does. Although Senate Democrats agreed to eliminate the diversity visa lottery program as part of the 2013 comprehensive immigration reform bill, there is no consensus within the party. In 2013, the Congressional Black Caucus expressed concern about plans to do away with the visas, about half of which go to people from African nations. The Uzbek population in the U.S. is relatively small, and a majority of new immigrants from the country came on diversity visas. Sixty-nine percent of Uzbek immigrants in 2010 were granted visas through the lottery, and only 2 percent came as refugees, according to analysis of government data by the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank. Tuesday afternoon, in the hours after the attack, Trump tweeted that it “looks like another attack by a very sick and deranged person.” He then appeared to suggest the event may be linked to the militant group that calls itself the Islamic State, which has not yet been found to have any connection to the attack. At least eight people were killed and 12 were injured after a man drove a Home Depot rental truck down a bike path on the West Side Highway, striking several people. The driver also rammed the truck into a school bus. Saipov, who was injured in the attack, was later taken into police custody. New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio called the incident an “act of terror.”

### 2nc Base Hates Plan

#### Trump enrages his base with the plan – hardliners oppose

**Bernal 17** (Rafael Bernal, The #Medill School of Journalism, Media, Integrated Marketing Communications at Northwestern University, "Five things to know about the diversity visa lottery", TheHill, 11-1-2017, accessed 7-11-2018, http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/358330-five-things-to-know-about-the-diversity-visa-lottery) //AL

Immigration hawks have been trying to end the program for decades The program has never been popular with immigration hard-liners, because it's a source of relatively unskilled labor in the United States. But the program hasn't attracted much attention because it accounts for a relatively low number of the total yearly immigrants. Roy Beck, founder and president of immigration reduction group NumbersUSA, said his main qualm with the visa lottery is that it displaces low-skilled American workers. "The fact that there have been some very famous cases of really bad actors that have come through this or linked to this is a matter of circumstance," said Beck. "The fact that somebody that's come through this program has done horrific things — we don't regard that as being the primary problem with this program."

#### Trump’s anti-diversity rhetoric is a core tenet of his base support – calls to end the program is a large part of that.

Tillery 18 Alvin B. Tillery Jr. is an associate professor of political science and director of the Center for the Study of Diversity and Democracy at Northwestern University. His research and teaching interests are in the fields of American politics and political theory. His research in American politics focuses on American political development, racial and ethnic politics and media and politics, 2018, “Alvin Tillery: President Trump’s Immigration Policy Revolves Around a Golden-Age Myth,” YubaNet, 01/16, <https://yubanet.com/opinions/alvin-tillery-president-trumps-immigration-policy-revolves-around-a-golden-age-myth/> Accessed 07/14/2018 //jsaltman

The reports that President Trump referred to immigrants from Haiti and African nations, as well as their home countries using disparaging epithets and racist language while simultaneously suggesting that America needs more immigrants from northern Europe, provides us with some context for understanding his immigration policies. In short, President Trump’s immigration policy revolves around the golden-age myth that America’s greatness as a nation is inextricably linked to its status as a majority-white nation. His desire to build a wall on the Mexican border and his various attempts to ban Muslim immigrants are about nothing more than fulfilling this vision and appealing to the large segments of his aging, mostly white voter base who share it. We know from survey data that Trump’s base voters have high levels of racial resentment and are deeply hostile to the demographic changes that will make the United States a majority-minority nation by 2050. While Mr. Trump is on the hot seat because he was the one who used the epithets, the view that America would be better off if the immigration stream were whiter is widely shared in mainstream Republican circles. This is precisely the logic undergirding recent calls by Republican senators to abolish the diversity visa and family reunification programs.

### 2nc Broken Promises

#### Trump promised to end the diversity visa program

**NPR 18** (NPR, "Trump's Immigration Proposal Would Eliminate Green Card Lottery", NPR.org, 1-31-2018, accessed 7-14-2018, https://www.npr.org/2018/01/31/582240526/trumps-immigration-proposal-would-eliminate-green-card-lottery) //AL

As part of his immigration proposal, President Trump has proposed eliminating the Green Card Lottery that allows around 55,000 people who have no family connection or employer sponsor to enter the U.S. each year. Muzaffar Chishti, a director of the Migration Policy Institute, explains the origin of the program and how it's changed. MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST: When President Trump laid out his immigration plan last night, he said it rests on four pillars. The third of those pillars is to end the Diversity Visa Program. PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP: A program that randomly hands out green cards without any regard for skill, merit or the safety of American people. KELLY MCEVERS, HOST: Most of us actually know this program as the green card lottery. No family connection is needed, no employer or sponsor. The most important ingredient you need is luck. The program had its origins in the 1980s. It was designed to benefit a growing population of undocumented Irish immigrants in New York and Massachusetts. KELLY: Later, it was broadened to include countries that don't generally send a lot of immigrants to the United States.

#### Trump attacked the diversity visa program

**Alvarez 17** (Priscilla Alvarez, assistant editor at The Atlantic, "The Diversity Visa Program Was Created to Help Irish Immigrants", Atlantic, 11-1-2017, accessed 7-11-2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/11/diversity-visa-program/544646/) //AL

On Wednesday, President Trump attacked the diversity visa program, which offers 50,000 visas a year, alleging that it was how the suspect in the Manhattan attack came to the United States. “The terrorist came into our country through what is called the ‘Diversity Visa Lottery Program,’ a Chuck Schumer beauty. I want merit based,” Trump said on Twitter, pushing instead for a system that would give preference to highly educated individuals who are considered more employable. “We are fighting hard for Merit Based immigration, no more Democrat Lottery Systems. We must get MUCH tougher (and smarter).” Later, Trump told reporters he was “starting the process of terminating the diversity lottery program.” He added that “we have to get less politically correct,” and although the program “sounds nice,” he said, “I’m not nice.”

## Advantage Cards

#### <<<Read some cards from the novice packet EB visas file about no econ decline, labor shortage is fake, etc.>>>

## Solvency

### Terror/Fraud Turn

#### DV program is susceptible to fraud

Rappaport 17—Nolan Rappaport, detailed to the House Judiciary Committee as an executive branch immigration law expert for three years; he subsequently served as an immigration counsel for the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims for four years. Prior to working on the Judiciary Committee, he wrote decisions for the Board of Immigration Appeals for 20 years, 2017 (“We don't need a terrorist attack to know diversity program has to go,” The Hill, 11-03-2017, Available Online at <http://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/358611-we-dont-need-a-terrorist-attack-to-know-diversity-visa-program-has-to-go>, Accessed 07-15-2018)//hk

A few days ago, a 29-year-old terrorist drove a rented pickup truck down a busy bicycle path in New York City, killing eight people and injuring a dozen more. The terrorist, a native of Uzbekistan, came to the United States in 2010 through the Diversity Visa Program (program) according to press reports. Uzbekistan is a large, majority-Muslim country located north of Afghanistan.¶ The next day, President Donald Trump said he wants congress to terminate the program.¶ Trump is not the first to want to end this program, and it is not just a partisan desire. The bipartisan Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S.744, that the Senate passed in 2013 would have ended the program if it had not been rejected on other grounds in the House.¶ S.744 was introduced by “the Gang of 8,” which included Senate Minority Leader Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.); Sen. Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), author of the original DREAM Act; and Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), a member of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus.¶ What is the Diversity Visa Program?¶ Section 201(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides 55,000 visas a year for a class of immigrants known as “diversity immigrants,” from countries with historically low rates of immigration to the United States.¶ ‘The number temporarily has been reduced to 50,000, to make up to 5,000 visas a year available for use by Nicaraguans who are eligible for the NACARA program.¶ The eligibility requirements are stated in section 203(c). The applicant must have been born in a designated country. There are exceptions based on other connections to the designated country. Also, he must have at least a high school education or its equivalent, or two years of work experience that required at least two years of training or experience to perform.¶ Reasons for terminating it.¶ While it may be difficult to justify terminating the program on account of the recent terrorist attack, there should be some benefit to offset the fact that the program could bring terrorists to the United States. If the New York City terrorist hadn’t been here, he wouldn’t have been able to commit a terrorist act here.¶ The claimed benefit is diversity, but does the program really make America more diverse? The United States has a population of 326,199,506 people, and that number is increasing by one international migrant (net) every 32 seconds. How does adding 50,000 aliens a year make the country more diverse?¶ Nevertheless, the program is bringing a lot of people in an absolute sense. Since 1995, it has made visas available to roughly one million people who have no ties to the United States. Is this fair to American citizens and legal permanent residents who get visa petitions approved to bring family members here and then have to wait years for visas to become available?¶ The Visa Bulletin for November announced that visas are available to the unmarried sons and daughters of citizens, and the spouses and children and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent residents, on the basis of visa petitions that were filed more than six years ago on or before January 22, 2011.¶ The required filing dates are November 15, 2015, for the spouses and children of permanent residents; November 15, 2010, for the unmarried sons and daughters of permanent residents; August 15, 2005, for the married sons and daughters of citizens; and May 22, 2004, for the brothers and sisters of citizens.¶ Relatives from some countries wait even longer.¶ The program always has had problems with fraud. An applicant once submitted more than 2,000 entries in a single year. Winners have sold themselves for marriage to bring a stranger to the United States as a spouse. And government audits have exposed sophisticated fraud schemes. This has included extortion rackets, sham marriages, and the use of fake identification documents.¶ Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission has warned lottery participants that scammers are using fraudulent schemes to take advantage of them.¶ Adequate background investigations can be difficult to conduct in many of the designated countries. All of the countries on Trump’s new travel ban list are on the list of eligible countries. In fact, in 2015, approximately 10,500 citizens from six of those countries were selected for the program according to the State Department.¶ Lastly, the visas are allocated randomly on the basis of a lottery run by the Department of State.¶ “A lottery is a crazy way to run an immigration system,” according to Steve Yale-Loehr, an immigration law professor at Cornell. “No other country selects immigrants based on a lottery.”¶ Wouldn’t the program add as much diversity if the same number of aliens, from the same group of countries, were to be selected on a merit-based point system?¶ My prediction is that the program will be terminated to make the visas available to family and/or employment-based immigrants.